Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35309
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dc.contributor.authorAndaluz, Joaquínen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarcén, Miriamen_US
dc.contributor.authorMolina, José Albertoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:50:19Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:50:19Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008112698en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35309-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA discussion papers |x3757en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFamily bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordStackelberg gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordfamily gooden_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDynamics of intrahousehold bargainingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn582912342en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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