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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35309
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Andaluz, Joaquín | en |
dc.contributor.author | Marcén, Miriam | en |
dc.contributor.author | Molina, José Alberto | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-10-20 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T11:50:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T11:50:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008112698 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35309 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x3757 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Family bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Stackelberg game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | family good | en |
dc.subject.stw | Familienökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Extensives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 582912342 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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