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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen_US
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:50:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:50:10Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20090119104en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35298-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3914en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontribution preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordleadershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordleading-by-exampleen_US
dc.subject.keywordfalse consensus effecten_US
dc.subject.stwFührungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorie (Soziologie)en_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleWho makes a good leader? Social preferences and leading-by-exampleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn589772333en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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