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dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Indraneelen_US
dc.contributor.authorMaitra, Pushkaren_US
dc.contributor.authorMukherjee, Digantaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:35:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:35:40Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35276-
dc.description.abstractWe model the consequences of parental control over choice of wives for sons, for parental incentives to educate daughters, when the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments and altruistic but paternalistic parents benefit from having married sons live with them. By choosing uneducated brides, some parents can prevent costly household partition. Paternalistic self-interest consequently generates low levels of female schooling in the steady state equilibrium. State payments to parents for educating daughters fail to raise female schooling levels. Policies (such as housing subsidies) that promote nuclear families, interventions against early marriages, and state support to couples who marry against parental wishes, are however all likely to improve female schooling. We offer evidence from India consistent with our theoretical analysis.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 3336en_US
dc.subject.jelD10en_US
dc.subject.ddc300en_US
dc.subject.keywordArranged marriageen_US
dc.subject.keyworddowryen_US
dc.subject.keywordbride priceen_US
dc.subject.keywordfemale literacyen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarriage marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstable marriage allocationen_US
dc.subject.stwFrauenbildungen_US
dc.subject.stwEheen_US
dc.subject.stwElternen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwWohnsoziologieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwIndienen_US
dc.titleArranged' marriage, co-residence and female schooling: a model with evidence from Indiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559866933en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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