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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3285
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers' types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.
Schlagwörter: 
Signaling
job markets
education
employer learning
intuitive criterion
JEL: 
I20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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