Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35236
Authors: 
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Prat, Julien
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 3285
Abstract: 
This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers' types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.
Subjects: 
Signaling
job markets
education
employer learning
intuitive criterion
JEL: 
I20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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