|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35236
|
| | |
| Title: | | Job market signaling and employer learning  |
| Authors: | | Alós-Ferrer, Carlos Prat, Julien |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion Papers 3285 |
| Abstract: | | This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers' types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning. |
| Subjects: | | Signaling job markets education employer learning intuitive criterion |
| JEL: | | I20 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35236
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|