Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35236 
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dc.contributor.authorAlós-Ferrer, Carlosen
dc.contributor.authorPrat, Julienen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:35:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:35:11Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35236-
dc.description.abstractThis paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their employees over time. Contrary to the model without employer learning, we find that the Intuitive Criterion does not always select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the separating level of education does not depend on the observability of workers' types. On the other hand, when workers are also uncertain about their productivity, the separating level of education is ambiguously related to the speed of employer learning.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3285en
dc.subject.jelI20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSignalingen
dc.subject.keywordjob marketsen
dc.subject.keywordeducationen
dc.subject.keywordemployer learningen
dc.subject.keywordintuitive criterionen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsnachfrageen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmeren
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleJob market signaling and employer learning-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559866771en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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