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dc.contributor.authorD'Exelle, Benen
dc.contributor.authorRiedl, Arnoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-25-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:35:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:35:10Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008091734en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35234-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but also information on who makes use of an available punishment mechanism through majority voting may be important. The main results are the following. First, many rich community representatives try to satisfy a political majority who would then abstain from using the punishment mechanism, and exclude those community members whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private information on the distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders are more reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives who follow the exclusion strategy are more inclined to exclude the poorest responder. Third, punishment is largely ineffective as it induces rich representatives to capture all economic resources. Fourth, if a poor agent takes the representative's role, punishment rates drop, efficiency increases, and final distributions become more equal.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3673en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDistribution of aiden
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.keywordsocial exclusionen
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimenten
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungspolitiken
dc.subject.stwBürgerbeteiligungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Isolationen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Ungleichheiten
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleElite capture, political voice and exclusion from aid: an experimental study-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn578524546en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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