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dc.contributor.authorD'Exelle, Benen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiedl, Arnoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:35:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:35:10Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008091734en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35234-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study the influence of local information conditions on elite capture and social exclusion in community-based development schemes with heterogeneous groups. Not only information on the distribution of aid resources through community-based schemes, but also information on who makes use of an available punishment mechanism through majority voting may be important. The main results are the following. First, many rich community representatives try to satisfy a political majority who would then abstain from using the punishment mechanism, and exclude those community members whose approval is then not required. The frequency of this exclusion strategy is highest with private information on the distribution and public voting. Second, when voting is public, responders are more reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism, and representatives who follow the exclusion strategy are more inclined to exclude the poorest responder. Third, punishment is largely ineffective as it induces rich representatives to capture all economic resources. Fourth, if a poor agent takes the representative's role, punishment rates drop, efficiency increases, and final distributions become more equal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3673en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDistribution of aiden_US
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial exclusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimenten_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwB├╝rgerbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Isolationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Ungleichheiten_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleElite capture, political voice and exclusion from aid: an experimental studyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn578524546en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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