Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorKaas, Leoen
dc.contributor.authorMadden, Paulen
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-16-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:33:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:33:53Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008040997en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125-
dc.description.abstractTwo firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3434en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordHotellingen
dc.subject.keywordduopsonyen
dc.subject.keywordminimum wagesen
dc.subject.stwHotelling Modellen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsnachfrageen
dc.subject.stwLohnen
dc.subject.stwRäumlicher Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMinimum wages and welfare in a hotelling duopsony-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn564784788en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
274.86 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.