EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125
  
Title:Minimum wages and welfare in a hotelling duopsony PDF Logo
Authors:Kaas, Leo
Madden, Paul
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion Papers 3434
Abstract:Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.
Subjects:Hotelling
duopsony
minimum wages
JEL:D43
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008040997
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
564784788.pdf274.86 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.