Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125
Authors: 
Kaas, Leo
Madden, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 3434
Abstract: 
Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.
Subjects: 
Hotelling
duopsony
minimum wages
JEL: 
D43
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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