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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Dietmaren
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen
dc.contributor.authorDanz, Daviden
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-22-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:33:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:33:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20080820126en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35072-
dc.description.abstractWe study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the opponent's payoffs and (iii) with random matching. Using Stahl and Wilson's (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. We use belief statements to check for the consistency of subjects' actions with the stated beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice). In the baseline treatment we observe more sophisticated play as well as more accurate beliefs and more best responses to beliefs over time. We isolate feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3627en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleInformation and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn576953350en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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