Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35072
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dc.contributor.authorFehr, Dietmaren_US
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen_US
dc.contributor.authorDanz, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:33:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:33:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20080820126en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/35072-
dc.description.abstractWe study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the opponent's payoffs and (iii) with random matching. Using Stahl and Wilson's (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. We use belief statements to check for the consistency of subjects' actions with the stated beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice). In the baseline treatment we observe more sophisticated play as well as more accurate beliefs and more best responses to beliefs over time. We isolate feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x3627en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleInformation and beliefs in a repeated normal-form gameen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn576953350en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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