Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35039
Authors: 
Brady, Michael P.
Wu, Steven Y.
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 3429
Abstract: 
We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of individuals, but the direction and magnitude of gift exchange depend critically on the procedure. This suggests that no general statements can be made concerning the propensity of groups to exhibit reciprocal or other-regarding behavior relative to individuals. The rules governing how group members can express their preferences and expectations to other group members are critical for determining group outcomes.
Subjects: 
Group behavior
teams
decision making
social preferences
JEL: 
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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