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dc.contributor.authorCampos, Nauro F.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGiovannoni, Francescoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:30:30Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:30:30Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008100949en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34894-
dc.description.abstractAlthough the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA discussion papers 3693en_US
dc.subject.jelE23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordLobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical institutionsen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.subject.stwIndustriestaatenen_US
dc.titleLobbying, corruption and other banesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn578668866en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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