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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34826
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gagliarducci, Stefano | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Nannicini, Tommaso | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Naticchioni, Paolo | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-08-26 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T11:29:48Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T11:29:48Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34826 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians' rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher proportion of bills targeted at local areas and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion Papers 3348 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 320 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Electoral rule | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | politicians | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | targeted redistribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rent-seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | regression discontinuity design | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | treatment effect | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politiker | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlsystem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Regionalpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wahlkreis | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rent Seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Italien | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Electoral rules and politicians' behavior: a micro test | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 559866968 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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