Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34808
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dc.contributor.authorGrodner, Andrewen_US
dc.contributor.authorKniesner, Thomas J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:29:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:29:35Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2008100821en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34808-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the socially optimal wealth distribution in a two-person two-good model with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric social interactions where only one (social) individual derives positive or negative utility from the leisure of the other (non-social) individual. We show that the interdependence can effectively counter-act the need to transfer wealth to low-wage individuals and may require them to be poorer by all objective measures. We demonstrate that in the presence of social interactions it can be socially desirable to keep substantial wealth inequality.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA discussion papers |x3684en_US
dc.subject.jelD31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordWealth inequalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordearnings inequalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial interactionsen_US
dc.subject.stwVermögensverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDistribution of wealth and interdependent preferencesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn578594064en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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