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dc.contributor.authorEderer, Florianen_US
dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:29:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:29:25Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34795-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational agents should completely disregard the performance feedback of self-interested principals and choose their effort level as if they had not been given any information. However, despite substantial underreporting many principals seem to exhibit lying aversion which renders their feedback informative. Therefore, the agents respond to the feedback but discount it strongly by reducing their effort relative to fully truthful performance feedback. Moreover, previous experiences of being deceived exacerbate the problem and eventually reduce average effort even below the level that prevails in the absence of any feedback. Thus, both no feedback and truthful feedback are better for incentives than biased feedback.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 3200en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDeceptionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddishonestyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcheap talken_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic tournamentsen_US
dc.subject.stwBetrugen_US
dc.subject.stw├ľkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDeception and incentives: how dishonesty undermines effort provisionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559459300en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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