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dc.contributor.authorGagliarducci, Stefanoen_US
dc.contributor.authorNannicini, Tommasoen_US
dc.contributor.authorNaticchioni, Paoloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T11:28:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T11:28:20Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34766-
dc.description.abstractIn most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a unique dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. Conversely, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in many respects, like voting attendance and bills sponsorship.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 3295en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc320en_US
dc.subject.keywordPoliticiansen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordabsenteeismen_US
dc.subject.keywordoutside incomeen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleOutside income and moral hazard: the elusive quest for good politiciansen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559459475en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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