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dc.contributor.authorSchnedler, Wendelinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-11-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:54:18Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:54:18Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/34069-
dc.description.abstractWhen designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager's employer. A necessary condition for the trade-off between responsiveness and similarity to be meaningful is that a perfectly congruent measure creates a higher benefit than an equally responsive non-congruent measure. We show that this condition is met if and only if all tasks are exactly equally difficult and there are no spill-overs or synergies across tasks. This means that for most practical purposes, notions of responsiveness and similarity are not informative about the tradeoff between insurance and allocation. In order to understand this trade-off, task difficulty has also to be taken into account.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 2124en_US
dc.subject.jelM41en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordhidden actionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmultitaskingen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeurteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTask difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated efforten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn51234342Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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