Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33753
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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Johnen_US
dc.contributor.authorEstrin, Saulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:51:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:51:05Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33753-
dc.description.abstractWe model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2150en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelO14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordentryen_US
dc.subject.keywordentry barriersen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeveloping economyen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwKonzessionen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleRegulatory barriers and entry in developing economiesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn512890528en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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