Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33753 
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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Johnen
dc.contributor.authorEstrin, Saulen
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-05-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:51:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:51:05Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33753-
dc.description.abstractWe model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2150en
dc.subject.jelL50en
dc.subject.jelO14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordentryen
dc.subject.keywordentry barriersen
dc.subject.keyworddeveloping economyen
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwKonzessionen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleRegulatory barriers and entry in developing economies-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn512890528en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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