Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673
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dc.contributor.authorAddison, John T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBarrett, Charles Richarden_US
dc.contributor.authorSiebert, William Stanleyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-04-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:13:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:13:50Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673-
dc.description.abstractThe paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more deserving workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contractsen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1866en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordseparating the various worker typesen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Sozialleistungenen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialrechten_US
dc.subject.stwSozialpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBuilding blocks in the economics of mandatesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn504099485en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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