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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Addison, John T. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Barrett, Charles Richard | en |
dc.contributor.author | Siebert, William Stanley | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-04-03 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T09:13:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T09:13:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33673 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more deserving workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1866 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | separating the various worker types | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betriebliche Sozialleistungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sozialrecht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sozialpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Allokationseffizienz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Building blocks in the economics of mandates | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 504099485 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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