Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33615
Authors: 
Luechinger, Simon
Meier, Stephan
Stutzer, Alois
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 1964
Abstract: 
The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services allows government employees to acquire rents. Those rents can involve higher wages, monetary and non-monetary fringe benefits (e.g. pensions and staffing), and/or bribes. We propose a direct measure to capture the total of these rents: the difference in reported subjective well-being between bureaucrats and people working in the private sector. In a sample of 38 countries, we find large variations in the extent of rents in the public bureaucracy. The extent of rents is determined by differences in institutional constraints and correlates with perceptions of corruption. We find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy.
Subjects: 
public sector
rents
life satisfaction
corruption
judicial independence
JEL: 
D72
D73
I31
J30
J45
K42
H11
H83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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