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IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33588
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| Title: | | Screening disability insurance applications  |
| Authors: | | de Jong, Philip R. Lindeboom, Maarten van der Klaauw, Bas |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion Papers 1981 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits. |
| Subjects: | | disability insurance experiment policy evaluation sickness absenteeism self-screening |
| JEL: | | J28 J65 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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