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Title:Screening disability insurance applications PDF Logo
Authors:de Jong, Philip R.
Lindeboom, Maarten
van der Klaauw, Bas
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:IZA Discussion Papers 1981
Abstract:This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
Subjects:disability insurance
experiment
policy evaluation
sickness absenteeism
self-screening
JEL:J28
J65
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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