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dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien_US
dc.contributor.authorPoutvaara, Panuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:12:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:12:39Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33550-
dc.description.abstractWe argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 1918en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical partiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided platformsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetwork formationen_US
dc.subject.stwPatronageen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien_US
dc.subject.stwKlubtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePolitical parties and network formationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn506211630en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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