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| Title: | | Political parties and network formation  |
| Authors: | | Miettinen, Topi Poutvaara, Panu |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion Papers 1918 |
| Abstract: | | We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties. |
| Subjects: | | political parties two-sided platforms network formation |
| JEL: | | D72 D85 L14 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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