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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 2054
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict non-compete agreement.
Schlagwörter: 
fine
incentive
incomplete contracts
non-compete agreements
option contract
JEL: 
D21
D86
J3
K1
M5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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