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dc.contributor.authorCahuc, Pierreen
dc.contributor.authorZylberberg, Andréen
dc.date.accessioned2005-10-14-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:11:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:11:39Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33417-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the discounted value of the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed). Our quantitative analysis suggests that the introduction of layoff taxes, that are usually absent from actual tax schemes, could lead to significant increases in employment and GDP.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1678en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH32en
dc.subject.jelJ38en
dc.subject.jelJ65en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlayoff taxesen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen
dc.subject.keywordjob destructionen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerbegünstigungen
dc.subject.stwBeschäftigungspolitiken
dc.titleOptimum income taxation and layoff taxes-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn495975788en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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