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dc.contributor.authorBandiera, Orianaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBarankay, Iwanen_US
dc.contributor.authorRasul, Imranen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:11:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:11:33Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33403-
dc.description.abstractWe present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 2062en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordtargetingen_US
dc.subject.keywordselectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordearnings inequalityen_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwManagementen_US
dc.subject.stwErfolgsbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwUngelernte Arbeitskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsproduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwLohndifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwGroßbritannienen_US
dc.titleIncentives for managers and inequality among workers: evidence from a firm level experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510380387en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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