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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33393
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| Title: | | A constitutional theory of the family  |
| Authors: | | Cigno, Alessandro |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IZA Discussion Papers 1797 |
| Abstract: | | The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models. |
| Subjects: | | families self-enforcing constitutions renegotiation-proofness altruism fertility saving transfers attention pensions credit rationing |
| JEL: | | C72 D02 D13 D71 D74 D91 H55 J13 J14 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
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