EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33365
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBurks, Stephen V.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCarpenter, Jeffrey P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGoette, Lorenzen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:11:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:11:10Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33365-
dc.description.abstractWe report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Firms therefore suffer efficiency losses when messengers fail to cooperate. Second-mover behavior in our sequential Prisoner's Dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. We find that messengers, like our student controls, have heterogeneous social preferences, but are much more cooperative than students. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those who are paid hourly or are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S. We find that the erosion of cooperation under performance pay is predominantly due to treatment, and that the treatment effect is relatively rapid, more akin to the differential cueing of a behavioral norm than the gradual acquisition of a new preference.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 2013en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelJ54en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfield experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordconditional cooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordegoismen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwFeldforschungen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Verg├╝tungen_US
dc.subject.stwFahrraden_US
dc.subject.stwKurierdiensten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Verhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titlePerformance pay and the erosion of worker cooperation: field experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn509195172en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
509195172.pdf226.38 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.