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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33245
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Irlenbusch, Bernd | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sliwka, Dirk | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-01-19 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-07T09:09:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-07T09:09:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33245 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In a second setting the principal has the possibility to supplement the fixed wage with a piece rate. Surprisingly, efforts are lower in the case where piece rates can be paid. Furthermore, switching in the same treatment from a setting where piece rates are available to one where only fixed wages can be paid tends to lead to even lower effort levels. Based on our findings we suggest a new explanation for motivation crowding out by arguing that the use of piece rates considerably alters the principals' and agents' perception of the situation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1758 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | crowding-out | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reciprocity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reputation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experiment | en |
dc.title | Incentives, decision frames, and motivation crowding out: an experimental investigation | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 500644276 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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