|
EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33245
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Irlenbusch, Bernd | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sliwka, Dirk | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2006-01-19 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-07-07T09:09:16Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-07-07T09:09:16Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33245 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In a second setting the principal has the possibility to supplement the fixed wage with a piece rate. Surprisingly, efforts are lower in the case where piece rates can be paid. Furthermore, switching in the same treatment from a setting where piece rates are available to one where only fixed wages can be paid tends to lead to even lower effort levels. Based on our findings we suggest a new explanation for motivation crowding out by arguing that the use of piece rates considerably alters the principals' and agents' perception of the situation. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | IZA Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | IZA Discussion Papers 1758 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | crowding-out | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | reciprocity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | reputation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experiment | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Incentives, decision frames, and motivation crowding out: an experimental investigation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 500644276 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|