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dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden_US
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:09:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:09:16Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33245-
dc.description.abstractA simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In a second setting the principal has the possibility to supplement the fixed wage with a piece rate. Surprisingly, efforts are lower in the case where piece rates can be paid. Furthermore, switching in the same treatment from a setting where piece rates are available to one where only fixed wages can be paid tends to lead to even lower effort levels. Based on our findings we suggest a new explanation for motivation crowding out by arguing that the use of piece rates considerably alters the principals' and agents' perception of the situation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 1758en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcrowding-outen_US
dc.subject.keywordreciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordreputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.titleIncentives, decision frames, and motivation crowding out: an experimental investigationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500644276en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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