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dc.contributor.authorKato, Takaoen_US
dc.contributor.authorLong, Cherylen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:07:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:07:51Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33187-
dc.description.abstractUsing comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover. We find consistently for all performance measures including both stock return and various accounting measures that: (i) overall, CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance though the magnitude of the relationship is modest; (ii) CEO turnover-performance link is stronger when the percentage of company shares owned by the largest shareholder is larger. Furthermore, insofar as stock performance is concerned, (iii) turnover-performance link is found to be weaker for listed firms still controlled by the state; (iv) the appointment of independent directors enhances turnover-performance link; (v) the listing suspension mechanism, i.e., the ST designation, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency appears to be effective in improving turnover-performance tie; and (vi) listed firms with CEOs holding additional positions in the controlling shareholders have weaker turnover-performance link. Consistent with the law and finance approach to corporate governance and the literature on economic transition, our findings suggest that any fundamental improvement in China's corporate governance will require a broad program that encompasses not only privatization but also laws and their effective implementation to provide better protection for investors.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIZA Discussion Papers 1914en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelP34en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelO16en_US
dc.subject.jelO53en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelG15en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexecutive turnoveren_US
dc.subject.keywordfirm performanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordenterprise reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordownership structureen_US
dc.subject.keywordChinaen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransition economiesen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwBörsenkursen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsreformen_US
dc.subject.stwChinaen_US
dc.titleCEO turnover, firm performance and enterprise reform in China: evidence from new micro dataen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn506211606en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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