Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/33138 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 2059
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine a player's doping decision - a cost effect, a likelihood effect and a windfall-profit effect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.
Subjects: 
cheating
contest
doping
fraud in research
tournament
JEL: 
J3
K42
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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