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dc.contributor.authorJoosten, Reinouden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:40:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:40:11Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32669-
dc.description.abstractWe present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all nearby trajectories monotonically, i.e., the Euclidean distance decreasing steadily in time. For a GESE this property should holds for at least one metric. The TESS generalizes the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of Maynard Smith & Price [1973]. A TESS attracts nearby trajectories too, but the behavior of the dynamics nearby must be similar to the behavior of the replicator dynamics near an ESS. Both notions are defned on the dynamics and immediately imply asymptotical stability for the dynamics at hand, i.e., the equilibrium attracts all trajectories sufficiently nearby. We consider this the relevant and conceptually right approach in defining evolutionary equilibria, rather than defining a static equilibrium notion and search for appropriate dynamics guaranteeing its dynamic stability. Moreover, the GESE and the TESS take similar positions as the ESE and ESE do in relation to other equilibrium and fixed point concepts in general.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax-Planck-Inst. für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPapers on economics and evolution 0916en_US
dc.subject.jelA12en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary game theoryen_US
dc.titlePaul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theoryen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617152489en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Papers on Economics and Evolution, MPI für Ökonomik

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