EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32634
  
Title:On reciprocal behavior in prisoner dilemma game PDF Logo
Authors:Doghmi, Ahmed
Kobihy, Miloudi
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2009,072
Abstract:In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine the conditions which allow that mutual cooperation constitutes the equilibrium. we particularly focus on the reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information about the payoff distortion. We show that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium with complete information and is a Bayesian equilibrium when each player believes that his opponent behaves with 'large' reciprocity in incomplete information environment.
Subjects:Reciprocity
Behavior
Cooperation
prisoner's dilemma game
JEL:C7
A13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
610033824.pdf380.97 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32634

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.