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dc.contributor.authorDoghmi, Ahmeden_US
dc.contributor.authorKobihy, Miloudien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:37Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32634-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine the conditions which allow that mutual cooperation constitutes the equilibrium. we particularly focus on the reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information about the payoff distortion. We show that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium with complete information and is a Bayesian equilibrium when each player believes that his opponent behaves with 'large' reciprocity in incomplete information environment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2009,072en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelA13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordBehavioren_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordprisoner's dilemma gameen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwAustauschtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn reciprocal behavior in prisoner dilemma gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn610033824en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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