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Title:Hidden costs of control: Three repetitions and an extension PDF Logo
Authors:Ploner, Matteo
Schmelz, Katrin
Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2010,007
Abstract:We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where performance-based rewards are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a at participation fee. Our extension largely reproduces the striking findings of the original study. In particular, we observe that hidden costs outweigh benefits of control.
Experimental Economics
Intrinsic Motivation
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers (2007-2014), Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik und Universität Jena

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