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|Title:||Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents |
Kocher, Martin G.
|Issue Date:||2010 |
|Series/Report no.:||Jena economic research papers 2010,016|
|Abstract:||One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is 'discrimination' between the two agents and that the available information for agents determines the extent of this discrimination, even though the theoretical solution of the game implies equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against react negatively by withholding effort.|
permanent and temporary employment
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Jena Economic Research Papers (2007-2014), Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik und Universität Jena|
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