Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32617
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Sääksvuori, Lauri
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2010,022
Abstract: 
This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested social dilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into two groups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoretically derived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental results demonstrate the importance of in-group beneficiaries over global efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes local level feedback. Results stress the importance of building strong local level commitment to encourage the provision of public goods with positive externalities.
Subjects: 
Public good
experiment
groups
Spillover Game
social dilemma
JEL: 
H41
C72
C91
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
472.21 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.