Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32611
Authors: 
Winter, Fabian
Rauhut, Heiko
Helbing, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,087
Abstract: 
Norms play an important role in establishing social order. The current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general theory of normative conflict by differentiating between two different kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations of which means should be chosen to fulfil the norm, the second from distinct expectations of how strong the norm should restrain the self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in an experiment that applies the strategy method to the ultimatum game. Our data reveal normative conflict among different types of actors, in particular among egoistic, equity, equality and cherry picker types
Subjects: 
Social norms
normative conflict
cooperation
ultimatum game
strategy method
equity
JEL: 
Z130
C91
D30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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