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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:34:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:34:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32604-
dc.description.abstractAlthough one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2010,014en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAuctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordFair Divisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordProcedural fairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnvy-Freenessen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwNeiden_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approachen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn62227399Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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