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dc.contributor.authorBecker, Aliceen_US
dc.contributor.authorBrünner, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:33:52Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:33:52Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32578-
dc.description.abstractA unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned by group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating the others monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel, Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and experimentally for the common value case and compare our results to the corresponding common value auction. Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games, behavior differs strikingly. Implementing auctions and fair division games in the lab in a repeated setting under first- and second-price rule, we find that overall behavior is much more dispersed for the fair division games than for the auctions. Winners' profit margins and shading rates are on average slightly lower for the fair division game. Moreover, we find that behavior in the fair division game separates into extreme overand underbidding.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2009,090en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon value auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordwinner's curseen_US
dc.subject.keywordfair division gameen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleBidding in common value fair division games: The winner's curse or even worse?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn614471931en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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