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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32577
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| Title: | | Internal and external political competition  |
| Authors: | | Hugh-Jones, David |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2009,067 |
| Abstract: | | All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers' incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to fight for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours. |
| Subjects: | | political competition dictatorship democracy transitions |
| JEL: | | D72 H77 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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