Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32577
Authors: 
Hugh-Jones, David
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,067
Abstract: 
All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers' incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to fight for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours.
Subjects: 
political competition
dictatorship
democracy
transitions
JEL: 
D72
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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