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Title:Internal and external political competition PDF Logo
Authors:Hugh-Jones, David
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2009,067
Abstract:All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers' incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to fight for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours.
Subjects:political competition
dictatorship
democracy
transitions
JEL:D72
H77
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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