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dc.contributor.authorMarch, Christophen
dc.contributor.authorZiegelmeyer, Anthonyen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-28-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:33:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:33:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32567-
dc.description.abstractWe revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Individuals either overweigh or underweigh (in Bayesian terms) their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others and each individual's updating rule is private information. First, we consider a setting with perfectly rational individuals with a commonly known distribution of updating rules. We show that introducing heterogeneous updating rules in a simple social learning environment reconciles equilibrium predictions with laboratory evidence. Additionally, a model of social learning with bounded private beliefs and sufficiently rich updating rules corresponds to a model of social learning with unbounded private beliefs. A straightforward implication is that heterogeneity in updating rules is efficiency-enhancing in most social learning environments. Second, we investigate the implications of heterogeneous updating rules in social learning environments where individuals only understand the relation between the aggregate distribution of decisions and the state of the world. Unlike in rational social learning, heterogeneous updating rules do not lead to a substantial improvement of the societal welfare and there is always a non-negligible likelihood that individuals become extremely and wrongly confident about the state of the worlden
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2009,105en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSocial learningen
dc.subject.keywordNon-Bayesian updatingen
dc.subject.keywordHerdingen
dc.subject.keywordInformational cascadesen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwHerdenverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleBehavioral social learning-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617354480en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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