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dc.contributor.authorMarch, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorZiegelmeyer, Anthonyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20T14:33:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-20T14:33:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32567-
dc.description.abstractWe revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Individuals either overweigh or underweigh (in Bayesian terms) their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others and each individual's updating rule is private information. First, we consider a setting with perfectly rational individuals with a commonly known distribution of updating rules. We show that introducing heterogeneous updating rules in a simple social learning environment reconciles equilibrium predictions with laboratory evidence. Additionally, a model of social learning with bounded private beliefs and sufficiently rich updating rules corresponds to a model of social learning with unbounded private beliefs. A straightforward implication is that heterogeneity in updating rules is efficiency-enhancing in most social learning environments. Second, we investigate the implications of heterogeneous updating rules in social learning environments where individuals only understand the relation between the aggregate distribution of decisions and the state of the world. Unlike in rational social learning, heterogeneous updating rules do not lead to a substantial improvement of the societal welfare and there is always a non-negligible likelihood that individuals become extremely and wrongly con̈i¬dent about the state of the worlden_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. [u.a.] Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2009,105en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial learningen_US
dc.subject.keywordNon-Bayesian updatingen_US
dc.subject.keywordHerdingen_US
dc.subject.keywordInformational cascadesen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwHerdenverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleBehavioral social learningen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617354480en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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