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dc.contributor.authorFellner, Gerlindeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSausgruber, Ruperten_US
dc.contributor.authorTraxler, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:14Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32253-
dc.description.abstractWe run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,31en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordField experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaw enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomplianceen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeterrenceen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwFeldforschungen_US
dc.subject.stwRundfunkfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwSchuldrechten_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleTesting enforcement strategies in the field: legal threat, moral appeal and social informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608968390en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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