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Title:Testing enforcement strategies in the field: legal threat, moral appeal and social information PDF Logo
Authors:Fellner, Gerlinde
Sausgruber, Rupert
Traxler, Christian
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,31
Abstract:We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.
Subjects:Field experiments
law enforcement
compliance
deterrence
JEL:K42
C93
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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