Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32250 
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32250-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs. This suggests an intriguing link between mechanism design for large economies and voting.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,02en
dc.subject.jelD60en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic-good provisionen
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen
dc.subject.keywordLarge Economyen
dc.titlePublic-good provision in a large economy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617293333en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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