Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32250
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:13Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32250-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs. This suggests an intriguing link between mechanism design for large economies and voting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,02en_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic-good provisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.keywordLarge Economyen_US
dc.titlePublic-good provision in a large economyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617293333en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
646.02 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.