Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32250
Authors: 
Bierbrauer, Felix
Hellwig, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,02
Abstract: 
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs. This suggests an intriguing link between mechanism design for large economies and voting.
Subjects: 
Public-good provision
Mechanism Design
Large Economy
JEL: 
D60
D70
D82
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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